By Emmanuel Nnadozie Onwubiko

Nigeria is facing a public-health emergency that demands urgent, coordinated and decisive action. The widespread circulation of falsified, counterfeit, adulterated and substandard medicines, food products, alcoholic beverages and other regulated goods poses a grave threat to the lives and well-being of millions of citizens.

Anyone who actively follows social media discussions in Nigeria will have noticed growing public concern about the proliferation of these dangerous products and questions surrounding the effectiveness of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), the statutory institution responsible for regulating food, medicines and other products under its mandate.

If a properly designed, transparent and representative public-opinion survey were conducted to assess Nigerians’ confidence in NAFDAC’s performance, the results would provide valuable insights into the public’s perception of the agency. Although it would be premature to assert that more than 90 per cent of Nigerians believe the agency has failed without reliable survey evidence, the intensity of public concern is unmistakable.

One troubling indicator is the frequency of reports announcing arrests, raids and seizures involving suspected manufacturers, importers, distributors and sellers of counterfeit products. These enforcement operations demonstrate that NAFDAC is taking action against offenders. However, they also raise a fundamental question: why do these criminal networks continue to operate on such a scale, despite repeated interventions by the regulator?

The irony is that, while some Nigerians accuse the agency’s current leadership of failing to contain the menace, NAFDAC continues to announce significant enforcement successes. The problem, therefore, cannot be assessed solely by counting arrests or measuring the monetary value of seized goods. The more important questions are whether these operations are preventing dangerous products from reaching consumers, dismantling the networks responsible for their production and distribution, and producing a sustained reduction in the availability of falsified and substandard products.

Many Nigerians remember the public-health advocacy associated with the late Professor Dora Akunyili, whose leadership of NAFDAC became a defining period in the national campaign against counterfeit medicines. Her legacy continues to shape public expectations of the agency.

What Nigerians require today is a comparable sense of urgency, institutional courage and preventive action. The country needs a regulatory system capable of identifying and disrupting illegal manufacturing and distribution networks before their products reach pharmacies, markets, shops and households.

The objective must be prevention, not merely the seizure of dangerous products after they have entered circulation.

The rural challenge and the limits of enforcement

NAFDAC cannot effectively combat this crisis through market raids alone. Nigeria has a vast geographical area, a large population and an extensive network of formal and informal trading locations. These circumstances make comprehensive surveillance difficult, particularly where staffing, transport, laboratory capacity and funding are inadequate.

The geographical distribution of Nigeria’s population further complicates enforcement. Figures attributed to the World Bank and reported by Trading Economics indicate that Nigeria’s rural population accounted for approximately 44.97 per cent of the total population in 2024.

This proportion underscores the importance of extending regulatory oversight beyond major cities and commercial centres. Rural communities must not become neglected markets where dangerous products can circulate because regulatory personnel and resources are insufficient.

However, rural residence alone does not establish that consumers are more likely to encounter counterfeit medicines. Demonstrating such a disparity would require reliable market-surveillance data. Nevertheless, the difficulty of monitoring a country of Nigeria’s size makes a strong case for decentralised surveillance, better intelligence gathering and closer collaboration with state and local authorities.

NAFDAC must therefore combine its enforcement operations with preventive strategies, including inspections of manufacturing facilities, tighter oversight of importation, improved supply-chain traceability, stronger border controls and systematic monitoring of wholesalers and retailers.

The agency should also publish regular, accessible reports identifying the geographical distribution of enforcement operations, the products seized, the outcomes of prosecutions and the measures taken to prevent repeat offences. Such transparency would enable Nigerians to evaluate progress using measurable evidence rather than competing assertions.

What NAFDAC says it is doing

NAFDAC has outlined several initiatives intended to improve the quality and safety of medicines and other regulated products. These measures deserve examination because the effectiveness of the national response depends partly on the agency’s regulatory capacity, the implementation of its policies and the resources available to its personnel.

1. Regulation of active pharmaceutical ingredients

According to information attributed to NAFDAC, the agency began enforcing controls on active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in 2019. These ingredients are the substances responsible for the therapeutic effects of medicines.

The reported measures include requiring drug master files containing information about the manufacturing processes, quality and safety of pharmaceutical ingredients. The agency also stated that requirements were being introduced for the identification and testing of active ingredients in imported and locally manufactured medicines.

Such controls are essential because the quality of a finished medicine depends significantly on the quality of its ingredients and the conditions under which it is manufactured.

NAFDAC has also reportedly encouraged local pharmaceutical innovation by offering five-year market exclusivity to qualifying innovative companies capable of meeting domestic demand. The precise scope and current status of this policy should be confirmed against the applicable regulatory guidelines.

2. Pre-shipment controls and product registration

NAFDAC has also described pre-shipment provisional registration measures intended to ensure that products entering Nigeria meet the required standards.

Pre-shipment controls can help identify unsafe or non-compliant goods before they enter the country. However, they must operate alongside effective post-shipment inspections, market surveillance and traceability mechanisms.

A product’s registration should never be treated as a permanent guarantee of quality. Manufacturers can change production practices, supply chains can be compromised, and counterfeiters can imitate the packaging and registration details of legitimate products.

The regulator must therefore ensure that compliance is monitored throughout a product’s lifecycle.

3. Deployment of testing and authentication technologies

NAFDAC has reported using technological tools to identify suspected substandard and falsified medicines. These include:

– TruScan Raman spectroscopy equipment;
– Global Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) Minilab testing kits; and
– Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) technology.

These tools can strengthen field inspections and help identify suspicious products. Nevertheless, their effectiveness depends on the availability of equipment, trained personnel, reliable testing procedures and access to properly equipped laboratories.

Rapid field tests are not a substitute for comprehensive laboratory analysis where more detailed examination is required. NAFDAC must ensure that suspicious products are subjected to appropriate confirmatory testing and that the results inform enforcement decisions.

4. Laboratory capacity and quality assurance

The agency has reported operating four laboratories with ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation for testing medicines, vaccines, diagnostic test kits and other biological products.

Laboratory accreditation is important because it provides assurance that testing is conducted under recognised quality-management and technical-competence requirements. The current accreditation status and precise scope of each laboratory should, however, be confirmed from the relevant accreditation records.

NAFDAC has also described measures to strengthen the assessment of products imported from countries including China and India. These reportedly include reviewing the qualifications of Clean Report of Inspection and Analysis agents and laboratories, as well as combining pre-shipment testing with post-shipment assessments.

Such measures are particularly important in a country that depends substantially on imported pharmaceutical products.

5. Surveillance studies and reported failure rates

Historical studies cited by NAFDAC provide some indication of the agency’s efforts to assess medicine quality.

A study conducted in 2005 in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development reportedly found a counterfeit-medicine prevalence of 16.7 per cent, compared with 40 per cent in 2001.

Between 2010 and 2012, NAFDAC reportedly used TruScan equipment to assess 5,790 samples of antibiotics, antimalarials and antidiabetic medicines. The reported failure rate was 6.4 per cent.

Further studies of antimalarial medicines, conducted with Nigerian public-health programmes and the United States Pharmacopeia, reportedly recorded failure rates of 3.6 per cent among 800 samples in 2015 and 4.3 per cent among 900 samples in 2016. Subsequent rounds involving 897, 741 and 907 samples reportedly recorded failure rates below 2 per cent.

These findings should be interpreted cautiously. Different studies may use different sampling methods, locations, product categories and definitions of failure. A reduction in the failure rate of sampled products does not automatically establish a corresponding reduction in the overall prevalence of counterfeit medicines throughout Nigeria.

The important lesson is that surveillance must be continuous, representative and publicly reported. Nigerians need current evidence showing where the greatest risks exist and whether regulatory interventions are delivering sustained improvements.

6. Post-market surveillance and international cooperation

NAFDAC has also identified expanded post-market surveillance as a priority. The objective is to ensure that registered products continue to meet quality standards and to identify unregistered or falsified products circulating in the market.

The agency has reportedly considered strengthening cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries to improve surveillance and reduce the movement of substandard and falsified products.

Such cooperation is essential because illegal pharmaceutical networks can operate across national borders. Information sharing, coordinated inspections and intelligence-led investigations can make it more difficult for offenders to exploit weaknesses in individual countries’ regulatory systems.

NAFDAC has also acknowledged resource constraints, including insufficient vehicles and personnel. These limitations should be addressed through appropriate budgetary allocations, improved logistics and cooperation with relevant government institutions.

Finally, the agency advises Nigerians to avoid purchasing medicines from unreliable online sellers, check product registration details and expiry dates, examine packaging for suspicious differences and report suspected falsified products to the nearest NAFDAC office.

These recommendations are useful, but consumer vigilance cannot substitute for effective regulation. The primary responsibility for preventing illegal production and distribution must remain with the relevant authorities and the businesses legally responsible for the products they manufacture, import or sell.

Recent enforcement operations expose the scale of the challenge

NAFDAC’s reported enforcement activities illustrate the continuing challenge of detecting and disrupting suspected counterfeit-product networks.

Suspected counterfeit alcoholic beverages in Lagos

In a reported operation at a residential property at 322B Meiran Road, Agbado, Oke Odo, Lagos State, NAFDAC officials reportedly discovered more than 100 sacks of empty alcoholic-beverage bottles suspected of being intended for reuse in the production of counterfeit drinks.

According to an account attributed to the agency, the bottles were stored in a secluded residential location and were discovered following intelligence received by enforcement personnel.

The agency’s Assistant Director in its Investigation and Enforcement Directorate, Kunle Ojo, reportedly explained that the bottles included containers associated with different alcoholic-beverage brands. Officials alleged that the bottles were being washed and supplied to suspected counterfeiters for reuse.

NAFDAC said the bottles were destroyed to prevent their reuse in illegal production.

The discovery raises serious questions about the supply chains supporting counterfeit alcoholic beverages. Reusing branded bottles can make it easier for unscrupulous operators to disguise products of unknown origin and quality as genuine commercial brands.

However, the discovery of empty bottles alone does not establish that every bottle was used in counterfeit production. The purpose of the operation, the evidence collected and any subsequent prosecutions should be reported accurately.

The agency also reportedly urged residents to notify its offices when they observe suspicious activities in their communities.

Suspected counterfeit production at a Lagos trade fair complex

In another reported operation, NAFDAC announced that it had uncovered a suspected counterfeit-production facility at Zamfara Plaza within the BBA Trade Fair Complex in Lagos State.

The agency reportedly arrested two suspects who were allegedly involved in relabelling or revalidating energy drinks and popular wine and whisky brands.

The operation was reported in October, although the precise date and circumstances should be confirmed against NAFDAC’s original announcement.

The allegations demonstrate the importance of inspecting informal storage facilities and trading locations where products may be repackaged, relabelled or otherwise manipulated outside authorised supply chains.

Nevertheless, allegations against arrested suspects must be distinguished from proven criminal conduct. Any prosecution and subsequent judicial findings should be reported as they become available.

Seizure of suspected counterfeit and unregistered medicines

NAFDAC has also reportedly uncovered warehouses in an uncompleted building in Apapa, Lagos, containing banned, suspected counterfeit and unregistered medicines valued at more than ₦3 billion.

The reported discovery included injectable antimalarial products, antibiotics, sachet medicines and blister-packed drugs, alongside perfumes, body oils and cooking oils.

The agency reportedly seized and evacuated the products to prevent their distribution.

If confirmed by official seizure records, the operation would demonstrate the potential scale of the challenge confronting regulators. The presence of medicines alongside other consumer products also reinforces the need for inspections that cover the full range of goods within NAFDAC’s regulatory mandate.

Yet the monetary value of seized products, although significant, is not by itself a reliable measure of the public-health impact of an operation. Nigerians also need information about the quantities recovered, the origins of the products, the distribution networks involved, the results of laboratory tests and the outcomes of investigations and prosecutions.

Repeated discoveries of suspected counterfeit products should prompt authorities to investigate the networks behind them rather than merely remove individual consignments from circulation.

The human cost of falsified medicines

The consequences of substandard and falsified medicines extend far beyond financial losses to manufacturers or regulatory agencies. They can result in treatment failure, prolonged illness, antimicrobial resistance, disability and preventable deaths.

The WHO has warned that substandard and falsified medical products represent a serious global public-health problem. Its widely cited estimate is that approximately one in ten medical products in low- and middle-income countries is substandard or falsified.

That estimate is a broad global indicator, not a finding that one in ten medicines sold in every country is necessarily counterfeit. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the scale of the risk and the importance of effective medicine-quality controls.

The economic consequences are also substantial. The WHO has cited an estimated annual cost of approximately US$30.5 billion associated with substandard and falsified medical products in low- and middle-income countries.

The effects can be particularly devastating in countries where infectious diseases remain significant causes of illness and death. Medicines that fail to contain the correct active ingredients or contain inadequate quantities of them can undermine treatment, delay recovery and contribute to drug resistance.

Figures attributed to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have also highlighted the potential mortality burden associated with counterfeit and substandard medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Estimates cited in public discussions include hundreds of thousands of deaths annually, with malaria and pneumonia treatments accounting for substantial portions of the reported burden.

Such figures require careful attribution and verification because mortality estimates vary according to the products examined, the diseases included, the methodology used and the period covered. They should not be presented as definitive counts of deaths directly confirmed to have resulted from counterfeit medicines.

Nigeria must nevertheless take the danger seriously. Where malaria, bacterial infections and other treatable illnesses remain major public-health concerns, unreliable medicines can undermine the work of health professionals and place vulnerable patients at additional risk.

The financial implications are equally troubling. Treating patients whose original illnesses have been aggravated by ineffective or contaminated medicines places additional pressure on households, hospitals and public-health budgets.

The danger is compounded by the complexity of pharmaceutical supply chains. Nigeria imports medicines and pharmaceutical ingredients from several countries while also relying on domestic manufacturers and distributors. Neither imported nor locally manufactured products should be presumed unsafe merely because of their origin. Every product must be assessed according to verifiable quality standards, and every manufacturer or supplier must be held accountable for compliance.

NAFDAC must therefore strengthen oversight of imported medicines while ensuring that local manufacturers operate under rigorous quality-control requirements.

Open drug markets: a structural problem requiring decisive reform

One of the most difficult challenges is the continued availability of medicines through poorly regulated or inadequately supervised trading networks.

In an article published in The Lancet concerning the circulation of counterfeit medicines in Nigeria, Omotayo Fatikun highlighted the role of open drug markets in the distribution of medicines outside adequately controlled supply chains.

The argument is that medicines sold through informal markets can enter the supply chains of pharmacies, hospitals, wholesalers and retailers, making it harder to establish the provenance and quality of individual products.

This is a serious regulatory concern. However, the existence of an open drug market does not automatically mean that every medicine sold there is counterfeit or substandard. Reform must distinguish between legitimate traders who comply with applicable requirements and operators who manufacture, import, distribute or sell unlawful products.

The appropriate response is to establish a system in which pharmaceutical wholesale and retail activities operate under clear licensing requirements, enforceable quality standards and effective inspection arrangements.

NAFDAC, the Pharmacy Council of Nigeria and other relevant authorities should work together to strengthen pharmaceutical distribution and ensure that medicines pass through traceable, properly regulated channels.

Where existing markets cannot meet the required standards, authorities should establish a clear transition plan towards compliant pharmaceutical trading centres. Such a plan should provide legitimate businesses with a pathway to compliance while ensuring that dangerous products are removed from circulation.

Simply shutting down markets without providing viable, properly regulated alternatives could disrupt access to essential medicines, particularly for people in communities with limited healthcare infrastructure. Reform must therefore combine enforcement with practical arrangements for lawful and affordable access to medicines.

A stronger legal and institutional response is needed

The scale of the reported problem demands more than occasional raids and public announcements. Nigeria needs an integrated strategy that combines prevention, intelligence, prosecution, public education and institutional accountability.

First, the Federal Government should assess whether NAFDAC has sufficient funding, personnel, vehicles, laboratory facilities and technological resources to carry out its statutory responsibilities. Where deficiencies exist, they should be addressed through transparent budgeting, measurable performance targets and independent oversight.

Second, enforcement must extend beyond the seizure of goods and arrest of suspects. Investigations should identify the financiers, manufacturers, importers, warehouse operators, distributors and other participants in illegal supply chains wherever the evidence supports their involvement.

Third, prosecutors and the courts should ensure that cases are handled efficiently and fairly. Where guilt is established, offenders should receive penalties proportionate to the seriousness of their conduct and the harm caused, in accordance with the law. The possibility of substantial criminal profits must not outweigh the deterrent effect of effective enforcement.

Fourth, the National Assembly should review the applicable legal framework to determine whether existing offences, penalties, investigative powers and enforcement mechanisms adequately address the present scale and sophistication of counterfeit-product operations.

Any proposed amendments should be evidence-based, consistent with constitutional protections and designed to strengthen deterrence without compromising due process.

Fifth, the government should invest in public awareness. Consumers need reliable information about purchasing medicines safely, verifying product registration, recognising suspicious packaging and reporting suspected violations. Pharmacists, healthcare professionals, community organisations, traditional leaders and local authorities should be included in this effort.

Finally, NAFDAC should publish regular performance reports covering inspections, seizures, laboratory findings, prosecutions, convictions and repeat offenders. These indicators would help establish whether the agency is reducing the threat over time rather than merely responding to individual incidents.

Conclusion: Nigerians deserve protection, not promises

The Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA) and this writer support the establishment of properly regulated pharmaceutical wholesale markets and distribution systems capable of replacing unsafe and inadequately supervised trading practices.

Manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, retailers and other participants found to have engaged in unlawful activities should face the full consequences of the law. Where the evidence establishes deliberate conduct that places human lives at risk, the response must be firm, swift and proportionate.

The relevant legislation governing NAFDAC should be reviewed to determine whether stronger enforcement powers, better coordination and more effective penalties are necessary to confront the evolving threat. Any legislative reforms must be carefully designed, constitutionally sound and supported by evidence.

The welfare of Nigerians is not a favour bestowed by those in power. Section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”

That constitutional principle must translate into practical protection for citizens who depend on medicines, food and other regulated products to live healthy and productive lives.

The Federal Government must ensure that NAFDAC has competent leadership, adequate resources and a clear strategy for preventing the manufacture and circulation of falsified, adulterated and substandard products. The agency must also demonstrate measurable results, while remaining accountable to the public it serves.

This is not a call for indiscriminate punishment or for treating every alleged offender as guilty before trial. It is a call for a regulatory and judicial system that can identify genuine offenders, establish responsibility through lawful investigations and ensure that those convicted receive appropriate penalties.

Counterfeit medicines and dangerous consumer products can destroy lives, undermine confidence in healthcare and impose enormous costs on families and the national economy. Those who knowingly profit from such activities must not be allowed to operate with impunity.

NAFDAC must strengthen its preventive capacity, government must provide the resources required, and the courts must administer justice without unnecessary delay.

Nigerians have endured this threat for far too long. The time for fragmented interventions and unsubstantiated assurances is over. The country needs sustained, transparent and measurable action to dismantle illegal supply chains and protect every citizen, regardless of location or economic circumstances.

The siege of falsified and dangerous products must end. Protecting the health and lives of Nigerians must be a national priority.

Emmanuel Nnadozie Onwubiko is the founder of the Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA) and a former National Commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria.

By Emmanuel Nnadozie Onwubiko

When Senator Osita Bonaventure Izunaso returned to the National Assembly in 2023, more than three years ago, he came back to a Senate very different from the one he had previously known.

Nigeria was confronting a worsening cost-of-living crisis. The naira was under pressure, and the foreign-exchange market was unsettled. Infrastructure deficits remained widespread, while the South-East was still struggling with insecurity, the sit-at-home order and the economic consequences of prolonged political tension.

For Izunaso, the challenge was particularly complicated.

He was not simply another senator in Abuja. He represented Imo West, a constituency spread across 12 local government areas and embedded in one of the country’s most politically restive regions.

Two years into the 10th National Assembly, his record has consequently developed along three parallel tracks: legislation and oversight in Abuja, constituency interventions in Imo West, and advocacy on issues that have come to define the political conversation in the South-East.

That combination provides a more revealing picture of his time in the Senate than a simple catalogue of projects.

Capital-market reform and legislative responsibility

One of the first tests of Izunaso’s second Senate career came not from his constituency but from Nigeria’s financial markets.

In August 2023, he became chairman of the Senate Committee on Capital Market and Institutions.

It was a consequential assignment.

The capital market is where government policy, private investment, pension funds, companies and individual investors meet. At a time when Nigeria was trying to attract investment while battling currency instability and declining purchasing power, the committee’s responsibilities extended beyond technical regulation.

Izunaso’s committee became involved in the legislative process that produced the Investments and Securities Bill 2024.

The bill sought to replace the 2007 legislation and update the legal framework governing Nigeria’s capital market. It addressed issues including investor protection, market regulation, market abuse and the powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Izunaso was identified as the main sponsor of the legislation and played a prominent role in its consideration by the Senate.

The bill eventually passed the Senate in December 2024.

That episode says something important about the senator’s present role. His influence in the National Assembly is not confined to bills bearing his name. Committee chairmanship gives a lawmaker considerable influence over what comes before the chamber, how legislation is scrutinised and how regulatory institutions are subjected to oversight.

It is an influence that is less visible than the commissioning of a road or the distribution of empowerment equipment, but potentially broader in its consequences.

When the naira became a Senate issue

Izunaso also turned his attention to the foreign-exchange crisis.

He sponsored a motion calling for an investigation into the accumulation of foreign-exchange backlogs, activities in the forex market and the Central Bank of Nigeria’s development-finance programmes dating back to 2015.

The motion came at a time when businesses and households were feeling the effects of exchange-rate volatility.

For a senator representing a district where trading, manufacturing and small businesses are important components of local economic life, the issue had both national and constituency dimensions.

His intervention reflected an emerging feature of his Senate work: taking issues that appear to belong to Abuja and connecting them to the economic realities of people back home.

Besides, Senator Izunaso was the sole representative of Nigeria at the Money/202/20 Middle East which took place from September 14-16, 2026 at the Riyadh Exhibition and Convention centre in Malham, Saudi Arabia. The event was hosted by the Financial Sector Development Programme (FSDP), Saudi Central Bank (SANA), Capital Market Authority (IA); co-organized by Tahaluf and Fintech Saudi. Money20/20 Middle East brings together banks, Fintech companies, investors regulators, technology providers and policy makers to explore the future of payments, banking, financial infrastructure and digital finance.

But Abuja is only half the story

For most constituents, however, parliamentary committee work can seem remote.

The test of representation is often much more immediate: the road that connects one community to another, the electricity project, the student who receives a scholarship, the young person who receives equipment to start a business, or the patient who receives treatment during a medical outreach.

This is where Izunaso’s constituency programme has attracted the greatest attention from his supporters.

His office lists road rehabilitation, electricity, water, healthcare, education, agriculture and youth empowerment among the interventions undertaken in Imo West.

It also reports skills-acquisition programmes in communities including Akokwa and Urualla.

The senator’s empowerment programmes have distributed equipment such as sewing machines, grinding machines, welding tools, barbing kits and other items intended to help beneficiaries establish businesses.

Motorcycles and vehicles have also been included among the items distributed.

The political photographs from such events are easy to find. The harder question is what happens after the cameras leave.

Does the sewing machine become a viable tailoring business? Does the welding equipment create employment? Does the motorcycle become a source of sustainable income?

Those are the questions that ultimately determine whether an empowerment programme becomes a development intervention or simply another political ceremony.

Izunaso’s published record presents the programmes as part of an effort to promote self-reliance.

Education and human-capital development

Education has provided another important strand of the senator’s constituency work.

At his July 2024 town-hall meeting, Izunaso presented a first-year scorecard and highlighted scholarship programmes, youth training, healthcare and infrastructure interventions.

The senator reported that 200 students had benefited from scholarships.

His supporters have also pointed to interventions through the Kpakpando Education Foundation, including educational assistance and support for schools.

For families confronting the rising cost of education, such interventions can be significant.

But, again, the larger measure of success is not the announcement of a scholarship. It is whether the beneficiary completes school, acquires useful skills and eventually enters productive employment.

That is the difference between measuring activity and measuring impact.

Representation in a troubled region

Perhaps the most politically consequential aspect of Izunaso’s Senate career has nothing to do with roads or scholarships.

It is his position on the South-East’s political crisis.

Soon after his return to the Senate, Izunaso sought a political solution to the continued detention of Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra.

His intervention was controversial because Kanu’s case sits at the intersection of separatist agitation, national security, criminal justice and the long-running political grievances of the South-East.

Izunaso argued that a political approach could help create conditions for peace and address the economic damage associated with the sit-at-home order.

The Senate did not adopt his proposal for Kanu’s release.

But the senator continued to raise the issue.

His argument has essentially been that military and security responses alone cannot resolve a problem with deep political roots.

That position places him in a delicate political space. He is a member of the governing APC, yet he has advocated an approach to one of the South-East’s most contentious issues that has not always aligned with the harder security position of the Federal Government.

For constituents in Imo West, however, the issue is not theoretical.

The sit-at-home order has affected transport, commerce, schools and daily economic activity across the region. Any political or security intervention capable of restoring normal economic life therefore has direct consequences for the people Izunaso represents.

The Anim State question

Izunaso has also chosen to put his political weight behind the demand for another state in the South-East.

He has promoted the proposed Anim State, arguing that the creation of an additional state could improve political representation and development in the region.

The proposal has particular relevance to his political base because it involves areas around Imo West and neighbouring Anambra.

But state creation is one of the most difficult constitutional exercises in Nigeria.

It requires more than political enthusiasm. It requires the fulfilment of constitutional procedures and demonstrable support among affected communities.

Izunaso has nevertheless continued to push the proposal, making it part of his broader argument that the South-East requires greater political and developmental balance.

His support for the South-East Development Commission follows the same regional-development logic.

Together, the two issues show that his Senate agenda has increasingly moved beyond the boundaries of Imo West.

From intervention to impact

There is another way to look at Izunaso’s constituency interventions.

They represent an attempt to translate the abstract language of government policy into individual economic opportunities.

A road is infrastructure.

A scholarship is human capital.

A skills-acquisition programme is an employment intervention.

A medical outreach is social protection.

An empowerment tool is an attempt at livelihood creation.

That is the theory behind the model.

Whether the model works at scale is a separate question.

Izunaso’s official project platform reports interventions across all 12 local government areas of Imo West, while his supporters have cited hundreds of beneficiaries from empowerment programmes and thousands of persons living with disabilities who have received assistance.

Those figures are claims from his office and supporters and should be independently tested against project records, beneficiary accounts and evidence of completion.

That scrutiny is not a rejection of the interventions. It is precisely what political accountability requires.

Measuring legislative performance

There is a tendency in Nigerian politics to reduce legislative performance to numbers: how many bills were sponsored, how many motions were moved and how many projects were facilitated.

The numbers matter, but they do not tell the whole story.

A senator’s job involves legislation, representation, oversight and advocacy.

Izunaso’s first years in the 10th Assembly illustrate all four.

He has participated in financial-sector legislation as chairman of the Capital Market and Institutions Committee. He has raised questions about foreign-exchange management. He has sponsored legislative proposals dealing with infrastructure and fire prevention.

At home, his office has pursued education, healthcare, empowerment and infrastructure interventions.

And on the regional stage, he has continued to speak about Nnamdi Kanu, insecurity, state creation and the South-East Development Commission.

The record is therefore neither simply an Abuja story nor simply an Imo West story.

It is a story about a politician trying to operate in both worlds simultaneously.

The unfinished test

There is, however, a larger test ahead.

The 10th National Assembly still has time to determine the final shape of Izunaso’s legislative record.

Some bills associated with him and his committee have become law or advanced through the legislative process. Others remain proposals.

Some constituency interventions have been completed, while others require continuing assessment.

And some of the biggest issues he has championed—particularly state creation and the political resolution of the South-East crisis—remain far from settled.

That makes his first two years a chapter rather than a conclusion.

The senator has established the themes of his current representation: capital-market reform in Abuja, development interventions in Imo West and political advocacy for the South-East.

The more difficult part is converting those activities into durable outcomes.

For a lawmaker, that is ultimately where the difference between activity and impact lies.

A bill becomes meaningful when it changes the law and improves regulation.

A road becomes meaningful when it remains usable.

A scholarship becomes meaningful when it helps a student complete an education.

An empowerment programme becomes meaningful when the business survives.

And political advocacy becomes meaningful when it produces measurable change in the lives of the people affected.

That is the unfinished test of Osita Izunaso’s second journey through the National Assembly.

So far, his Senate career has been defined by an effort to occupy all three spaces available to a modern Nigerian lawmaker: the legislative floor in Abuja, the constituency at home and the wider political arena of the South-East.

What remains is for time and evidence to determine how deeply that effort has changed each of them.

EMMANUEL NNADOZIE ONWUBIKO is the founder of the Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria and a former National Commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria.

By Emmanuel Nnadozie Onwubiko

Nigeria appears trapped in a seemingly endless struggle against a hydra-headed monster: the vandalism, theft and destruction of critical infrastructure owned by the government and private individuals. These criminal activities undermine economic development, disrupt essential services, endanger human lives and impose enormous financial costs on a country already grappling with significant economic challenges.

Across the country, organised criminal networks continue to target electricity distribution systems, transmission lines, transformers, railway infrastructure, bridges, drainage systems and other public assets. In the oil and gas sector, the theft of crude oil and the sabotage of pipelines have also contributed to substantial revenue losses.

These are not merely isolated incidents of petty theft. They represent a serious threat to national development, public safety and economic stability.

The organised networks behind infrastructure vandalism

One particularly damaging category of economic crime involves the sophisticated networks responsible for vandalising crude oil pipelines, diverting petroleum products and facilitating the illicit sale of stolen crude oil.

The persistence of these activities raises serious questions about the effectiveness of existing security arrangements. It also fuels concerns about possible collusion between criminal syndicates and individuals within institutions entrusted with protecting the country’s critical infrastructure.

Allegations of complicity involving military or other security personnel must, of course, be established through credible investigations and evidence. Nevertheless, the scale and persistence of oil theft demand a more rigorous examination of how these criminal networks operate, who finances them, how stolen products reach their buyers and whether powerful interests benefit from the trade.

The question is straightforward: how can criminal operations of such magnitude continue for years without significant weaknesses, failures or possible compromises within the systems established to prevent them?

Private security contracts and the protection of oil infrastructure

The federal government’s response to persistent oil theft has included the engagement of private security contractors to protect critical oil and gas infrastructure.

During the administration of former President Muhammadu Buhari, lucrative security contracts were awarded to private operators, including companies associated with individuals in the Niger Delta. The arrangement generated public debate about the effectiveness, transparency and cost of relying on private contractors to protect nationally significant assets.

Supporters of this approach have argued that conventional security arrangements had failed to sufficiently curb oil theft and pipeline vandalism. They maintained that alternative strategies were necessary to achieve better results.

There is some merit in questioning a security strategy that repeatedly fails to deliver measurable improvements. However, the answer cannot simply be to transfer responsibility from public institutions to private contractors without transparent procurement, independent oversight and demonstrable results.

The public deserves to know how much these contracts cost, how their beneficiaries were selected, what performance targets were established and whether the expenditure has significantly reduced oil theft.

Claims that the contracts cost more than the entire annual defence budget should be supported by reliable budgetary and contractual records before being presented as established fact.

Ultimately, Nigeria needs a security framework that combines effective enforcement with transparency, accountability and measurable performance.

Nigeria lost 13.5 million barrels of oil worth $3.3 billion, NEITI reported

The financial consequences of oil theft and pipeline sabotage are substantial.

At the 2025 conference of the Association of Energy Correspondents of Nigeria (NAEC), the then Executive Secretary of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), Ogbonnaya Orji, reportedly disclosed that Nigeria lost approximately 13.5 million barrels of crude oil, valued at $3.3 billion, to theft and pipeline sabotage between 2023 and 2024.

The conference theme was Nigeria’s Energy Future: Exploring Opportunities and Addressing Risks for Sustainable Growth.

Orji reportedly observed that the lost revenue could have financed the federal health budget for an entire year or expanded energy access for millions of households.

He emphasised that the losses were not merely financial but also reflected institutional weaknesses, diminished public trust and missed opportunities for national development.

The significance of these figures cannot be overstated. Revenue lost through oil theft is revenue unavailable for hospitals, schools, electricity infrastructure, roads, social protection and other essential public services.

It is therefore imperative that the government strengthen the institutions responsible for preventing oil theft, investigating those involved and recovering proceeds derived from criminal activities.

Infrastructure vandalism is economic sabotage

The destruction of public infrastructure must be understood as more than an ordinary property offence.

When criminals remove electricity cables, dismantle railway components, destroy transformers or damage bridges, the consequences extend far beyond the immediate cost of replacing the stolen materials.

Businesses lose operating hours. Households endure prolonged power outages. Transportation networks become less reliable. Public funds that could have financed new infrastructure must instead be spent repairing damaged facilities.

In some circumstances, vandalism can also cause electrocution, railway accidents, structural damage and other potentially fatal incidents.

The same considerations apply to privately owned property. Individuals who invest their life savings in building homes or businesses should not have to live in fear that criminals will destroy those investments to steal iron rods, cables or other materials for resale.

The challenge, therefore, is not merely to apprehend individual offenders. It is to dismantle the networks that finance, facilitate and profit from infrastructure theft.

Scrap-metal dealers who knowingly purchase stolen public assets must also be held accountable where the evidence establishes their involvement. At the same time, legitimate recycling businesses should be distinguished from criminal enterprises.

Existing laws against vandalism in Nigeria

In a media interview, lawyer Mack Ogbamosa reportedly identified infrastructure vandalism as a major challenge facing Nigeria. He argued that existing laws provide mechanisms for prosecuting offenders but that stronger enforcement and more effective deterrence are necessary.

Nigeria has several federal and state laws that may apply to the destruction of public infrastructure, depending on the nature of the offence, the property involved, the location and the applicable statutory provisions.

Among the federal enactments relevant to this discussion are the Miscellaneous Offences Act, the Electricity Act 2023 and the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act. The Criminal Code and Penal Code also contain provisions concerning property damage and related offences, subject to their territorial application and the specific facts of each case.

The precise charges and penalties must be determined by reference to the current legislation and the facts proved in court.

1. The Miscellaneous Offences Act

The Miscellaneous Offences Act is among the federal laws historically invoked in prosecutions involving serious forms of sabotage and damage to public assets.

The provisions potentially applicable to particular acts of vandalism must be examined carefully. It would be misleading to assume that every incident involving stolen cables, railway components or damaged public property automatically attracts the same penalty.

The prosecution must establish the elements of the relevant offence, and the court must impose a sentence authorised by the applicable law.

For this reason, any claim that a particular subsection mandates 14 years, 21 years or life imprisonment should be checked against the exact statutory text and any relevant amendments before publication.

2. The Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act

Nigeria’s petroleum sector is particularly vulnerable to economic losses arising from the unlawful interference with production and distribution infrastructure.

The Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act addresses specified forms of sabotage involving petroleum production and distribution.

Its relevance to a particular case depends on the conduct alleged and the statutory elements established by the prosecution. Pipeline vandalism, crude oil theft and the unlawful interruption of petroleum operations may also engage other applicable laws.

Given the importance of petroleum revenue to the national economy, law enforcement agencies should investigate these offences thoroughly, identify the wider criminal networks involved and pursue those who finance or profit from the illegal trade.

3. The Electricity Act 2023

The Electricity Act 2023 provides an important legislative framework for Nigeria’s electricity industry.

The protection of electricity infrastructure requires effective legal and regulatory measures against the unlawful interference with power generation, transmission and distribution systems.

The theft of cables, destruction of transformers and deliberate damage to transmission infrastructure can impose substantial costs on electricity companies and consumers. Such acts can also undermine efforts to improve electricity supply.

The precise offence and available penalty must, however, be identified by reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and any other applicable legislation. Claims that a particular act of vandalism carries life imprisonment should not be published without verifying the specific statutory basis.

4. The Criminal Code and Penal Code

The Criminal Code applies in the relevant southern jurisdictions, while the Penal Code applies in the relevant northern jurisdictions, subject to the applicable federal and state legal frameworks.

These laws contain provisions addressing forms of property damage, malicious injury and related criminal conduct.

The applicable penalty depends on the offence charged, the circumstances of the case and the statutory provision under which the defendant is convicted.

State legislation may also provide additional offences and enforcement mechanisms. Accordingly, the prosecution of an infrastructure vandal should begin with a careful assessment of the relevant law rather than an assumption that all cases fall within a single legal category.

5. State-level laws and enforcement measures

State governments have also adopted laws and enforcement initiatives intended to protect public facilities and prevent the theft of infrastructure.

Lagos State, for instance, has pursued cases involving the alleged removal of bridge components and other public assets. Reports concerning the removal of iron materials from the Festac–Alakija Bridge illustrate the importance of investigating not only those who physically remove public property but also those who knowingly receive or trade in stolen materials.

Such cases should be documented with the relevant charge sheets, court records and judgments. These records would establish whether the suspects were merely arrested, formally charged, convicted or sentenced.

That distinction is important because an arrest is not proof of guilt, and an allegation does not become an established fact merely because it has appeared in the media.

Reported cases of infrastructure vandalism

Reports of arrests, prosecutions and convictions across Nigeria illustrate the breadth of the problem. The following cases have been cited in media accounts and should be checked against official court records before publication.

Third Mainland Bridge railings case (2026)

A report states that Abubakar Jaji was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment without the option of a fine for allegedly damaging and removing iron railings from the Third Mainland Bridge in Lagos.

The report attributes the prosecution to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

If confirmed by the relevant judgment, the case would demonstrate the seriousness with which the courts may treat the deliberate destruction of essential public infrastructure.

The precise date, court, statutory provision and sentence should be verified against the judgment.

Warri–Itakpe rail corridor case (November 2025)

Media reports have identified Mudasuru Mutari and Blorie Kokori as defendants convicted in connection with the dismantling of railway components near Abraka, Delta State.

The reported sentence was two years’ imprisonment, following prosecution under the Miscellaneous Offences Act.

The case highlights the vulnerability of railway infrastructure and the economic consequences of stealing components required for safe and reliable rail operations.

The final account should confirm the court’s decision, the exact offences and the sentences imposed.

Ebu Bridge drainage case (2025)

Another report concerns Emmanuel Sunday, who was reportedly sentenced by a court in Asaba, Delta State, for damaging the drainage system associated with the Ebu Bridge.

The reported sentence involved imprisonment and community service.

The details of the judgment, including whether the sentence was custodial, concurrent or partly substituted with community service, should be checked before the case is relied upon as an example of judicial sentencing.

Kano railway components case (June 2025)

Four suspects—Mukhtar Muhammed, Abdullahi Musa, Saidu Yusheru and Salisu Shuabu—were reportedly convicted after pleading guilty to offences connected with the theft of railway components in Gabasawa Local Government Area of Kano State.

The case illustrates the need to secure railway installations, identify markets for stolen components and ensure that recovered materials are traced to their legitimate owners.

The names, charges and sentences should be verified through the relevant court records.

Jibowu Bridge vandalism case (November 2024)

A report states that a Lagos Magistrate Court sitting in Oshodi sentenced a person to four months’ imprisonment for attempting to remove structural materials from the Jibowu Bridge.

The individual was reportedly apprehended by the Lagos State Kick Against Indiscipline Brigade.

If confirmed, the case would provide a useful example of intervention by enforcement personnel to prevent the removal of materials from public infrastructure.

Oredo transformer case (2026)

A further report states that Abubakar Dauda was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in Edo State on 18 August 2026 for the destruction or vandalism of a 200 kVA electricity transformer.

The report attributes the conviction to an Oredo Magistrates’ Court.

The court, offence, date and sentence should be confirmed from the official record before publication.

Lagos electricity infrastructure case (2025)

Another reported case concerns Inya Bethel, who was allegedly sentenced by a Lagos magistrate court on 21 July 2025 to 10 months’ imprisonment without the option of a fine for cable theft.

Such cases underline the importance of protecting electrical installations and prosecuting those who steal cables and other materials essential to electricity distribution.

The statutory provision and the court’s final order should be verified before the case is cited as an authoritative example.

Are Nigeria’s laws against vandalism sufficiently effective?

The persistence of infrastructure vandalism raises a fundamental question: are Nigeria’s existing laws adequate, and are they being enforced effectively?

My position is that the country needs a more coordinated and demonstrably effective response.

However, the issue is not necessarily that every existing penalty is too lenient. The real question is whether the combination of legal provisions, investigative capacity, prosecution, judicial sentencing and asset recovery is sufficient to deter offenders.

A severe penalty has limited deterrent value if offenders believe they are unlikely to be arrested, prosecuted or convicted. Conversely, consistent enforcement, prompt trials and the recovery of criminal proceeds can increase the risks associated with infrastructure theft.

Nigeria should therefore strengthen investigations, improve the protection of critical installations, ensure that prosecutors have adequate evidence and hold those who knowingly facilitate the trade in stolen infrastructure accountable.

Any proposed increase in penalties should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence, consistent with constitutional protections and supported by reliable evidence concerning the effectiveness of different enforcement strategies.

The destruction of beer bottles and the question of economic sabotage

The debate over economic sabotage extends beyond conventional infrastructure vandalism.

On 17 August 2024, a report discussed a Federal High Court decision concerning the destruction of alcoholic beverages by authorities in Kano State.

According to the report, Justice Emeka Nwite delivered a ruling on 20 May 2023 in a case brought by activist Sesugh Akume against the Attorney-General of the Federation and the EFCC.

The proceedings reportedly concerned the destruction of alcoholic beverages and whether the EFCC had responsibilities in relation to alleged economic sabotage arising from such conduct.

The issue is particularly relevant to Kano, where the Hisbah authorities have conducted operations involving the seizure and destruction of alcoholic beverages. Media accounts reported that millions of bottles had been destroyed during such operations.

The economic argument is that manufactured goods embody the labour, capital, transport, distribution and commercial activity that went into producing and supplying them. Destroying goods that could otherwise be lawfully traded may therefore raise questions about economic waste, property rights and the legal authority under which the destruction occurs.

However, the legal significance of the Federal High Court’s ruling must be stated precisely. A court’s decision about the duties of a particular agency, or the legality of a particular enforcement practice, should not automatically be interpreted as establishing that every destruction of alcoholic beverages constitutes economic sabotage.

The judgment must be examined to determine the precise orders made, the legal reasoning adopted and the extent of the court’s findings.

My broader argument is that government authorities should exercise their powers within the law. Where the destruction of property is authorised, the legal basis and procedure should be clear. Where property is destroyed unlawfully, the responsible parties should be subject to appropriate legal scrutiny.

The protection of public revenue, private property and the rule of law should not depend on whether a particular product or business is politically, culturally or religiously popular.

Borno State: Scrap-metal theft and the loss of electricity infrastructure

The consequences of infrastructure vandalism were also highlighted by Borno State Governor Babagana Umara Zulum, who reportedly raised concerns about the theft of electricity distribution wires worth billions of naira.

According to the report, the state lost wires associated with a power-line project valued at more than ₦3 billion, intended to connect electricity distribution infrastructure from Damaturu to Maiduguri.

The governor reportedly attributed the losses to metal scavenging activities and explained that his administration had imposed restrictions on scrap-metal trading because of concerns about public safety and the theft of public assets.

Zulum also reportedly expressed concern that some scavengers had been killed while collecting metals in communities that were not yet safe for civilian activity. He further raised concerns about allegations that insurgents were using scrap-metal trading channels to dispose of stolen materials.

The governor’s position, as reported, was that the restrictions were intended to protect public infrastructure and security rather than deprive legitimate traders of their livelihoods.

He reportedly allowed genuine operators to remove scrap materials collected before the ban from designated locations, an approach intended to reduce the immediate economic impact of the restrictions.

The situation in Borno illustrates the difficult balance between protecting essential infrastructure and safeguarding legitimate economic activity.

A blanket prohibition may disrupt lawful businesses and affect livelihoods. Yet failing to control the purchase and resale of stolen infrastructure can create a ready market for criminal activity.

A more sustainable approach would involve licensing scrap-metal dealers, requiring records of purchases and suppliers, establishing traceability procedures and prosecuting businesses that knowingly receive stolen public assets.

Where security conditions justify temporary restrictions, the government should communicate the legal basis, scope and duration of those measures and provide clear rules for legitimate operators.

FCT: Police recover infrastructure reportedly worth more than ₦1 billion

The Federal Capital Territory has also experienced significant concerns about the theft and destruction of public infrastructure.

According to media reports, the FCT Police Command announced the arrest of 31 suspects and the recovery of stolen public infrastructure reportedly worth more than ₦1 billion during a crackdown on vandalism.

At the time of the reported operation, the Commissioner of Police was Tunji Disu, who subsequently became Inspector-General of Police.

The reports stated that FCT Minister Nyesom Wike convened a security meeting on 13 January 2025, following which authorities directed the temporary closure of scrap-metal markets, commonly known as Panteka markets, across the territory.

The police and other security agencies subsequently launched an operation known as Operation Sweep, targeting suspected locations involved in the storage and sale of stolen infrastructure.

The reported operation commenced on 16 January 2025 and involved raids on scrap-metal markets in locations including Dei-Dei, Kabusa, Zuba, Mpape, Jabi and Nyanya.

The participating agencies reportedly included the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigerian Army, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Department of State Services and other relevant federal and FCT authorities.

What was reportedly recovered?

Items identified in the media reports included:

– Manhole and drainage covers.
– Armoured and insulated electrical cables.
– Industrial solar batteries and panels.
– Components from transformers and generators.
– Fibre-optic cables and copper wires.
– Underground water-board pipes and iron rods.
– Security doors, cement and other building materials.
– Motorcycles and electricity-generating sets.
– Vehicle identification materials and documents whose ownership reportedly required further investigation.

The authorities reportedly arrested 31 suspects, with 16 subsequently charged in connection with alleged offences involving conspiracy, mischief and possession of stolen public property.

The reports also stated that electricity distribution personnel had identified some recovered components as materials stolen from power installations across the FCT. Areas including Dawaki, Mpape, Nyanya and Karu were reportedly affected by prolonged power outages.

The reported operation further prompted measures requiring scrap-market operators to register and undergo profiling.

These developments demonstrate why enforcement against infrastructure theft must extend beyond the individuals caught removing cables or dismantling public facilities. Investigators must also identify the purchasers, transporters, financiers and intermediaries who make the criminal trade commercially attractive.

Nevertheless, arrests, recoveries and charges must be distinguished from convictions. The value attributed to recovered property, the identity of its lawful owners and the final outcomes of the prosecutions should be confirmed through official records.

The need for stronger enforcement and institutional accountability

Nigeria cannot afford to treat infrastructure vandalism as an ordinary nuisance.

The loss of electricity cables can deprive entire communities of power. The destruction of railway components can compromise transport services. The removal of bridge materials can threaten public safety. The theft of crude oil deprives the country of revenue that could otherwise finance development.

These consequences justify a determined response from the government, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.

However, the response must also address the institutional weaknesses that enable the problem to persist.

First, security agencies should conduct intelligence-led investigations into organised networks rather than concentrating exclusively on low-level offenders.

Second, government procurement and security contracts should be transparent. Where public funds are spent on protecting oil pipelines or electricity infrastructure, the public should be able to assess the results.

Third, scrap-metal dealers should be required to maintain adequate transaction records, verify suppliers and cooperate with lawful investigations. Businesses that knowingly purchase stolen public property should face appropriate sanctions.

Fourth, government agencies and infrastructure operators should improve physical security, inventory controls, monitoring systems and cooperation with local communities.

Fifth, prosecutions should be conducted diligently, with appropriate penalties imposed where guilt is established. Courts should have the evidence necessary to distinguish minor offences from serious, organised acts that cause extensive economic damage or endanger lives.

Finally, law enforcement agencies must investigate allegations of official complicity impartially. No individual should be protected from accountability because of military rank, political influence, commercial connections or public office.

Conclusion: Economic sabotage demands a decisive national response

My examination of reported cases involving the theft and destruction of critical infrastructure reinforces my conviction that Nigeria needs a more effective national strategy against economic sabotage.

It is difficult to justify a system in which the theft or destruction of essential public assets can impose enormous costs on millions of citizens while the individuals responsible may face limited consequences. Yet the appropriate response is not simply to demand the harshest possible punishment in every case. It is to ensure that penalties reflect the seriousness of the offence and that the law is enforced consistently, transparently and fairly.

Where existing legislation provides inadequate penalties for serious, organised infrastructure sabotage, the National Assembly and relevant state legislatures should consider proportionate reforms. Where the law already provides substantial penalties, the priority should be effective investigation, prosecution and enforcement.

I believe that the most serious cases of economic sabotage—particularly those involving organised criminal networks, deliberate destruction of essential infrastructure, substantial financial losses or conduct that endangers human lives—deserve to be treated with the gravity they warrant. For the gravest offences, lawmakers should consider whether substantially tougher penalties, including life imprisonment where constitutionally and legally justified, are appropriate.

At the same time, Nigeria must confront the market that sustains infrastructure theft. It makes little sense to arrest a person who removes electrical cables or railway components while ignoring the commercial networks that purchase, transport and resell the stolen materials.

Communities also need protection. Across parts of the country, families who have invested their savings in building homes and businesses face the threat of having their property damaged by criminals seeking iron rods, cables and other materials for resale. Such acts destroy not only property but also the security and dignity of the people affected.

In some communities, particularly in the South-East, residents have raised concerns about the theft of building materials and the perceived failure of law enforcement to secure accountability. These complaints deserve impartial investigation, and any allegations of bribery or the improper release of suspects should be substantiated and addressed through the appropriate legal channels.

Nigeria’s critical infrastructure belongs to the public and supports the welfare of millions of citizens. Its protection must therefore be a national priority.

The government should harmonise and strengthen the legal framework where necessary, improve coordination among enforcement agencies, ensure the transparent management of security contracts and vigorously prosecute those whose guilt is established in court.

Above all, the country must end the culture of impunity that allows economic sabotage to remain profitable. Public infrastructure must be protected, legitimate businesses must be allowed to operate, and those who deliberately destroy the assets on which national development depends must be held accountable under the law.

Emmanuel Nnadozie Onwubiko is the founder of the Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA) and a former National Commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria.